Almalieque wrote:
TLW wrote:
No evidence of hacking on a system that has no way to detect it.
Having an unsecure system isn't the same as not having a way to detect it. You're purposefully trying to worsen the situation to support your talking points. Regardless, you're still avoiding the real issue is the classification of the system, not the security.
No, I'm literally citing a the publicly available press report.
FBI Director Comey wrote:
With respect to potential computer intrusion by hostile actors, we did not find direct evidence that Secretary Clinton’s personal e-mail domain, in its various configurations since 2009, was successfully hacked. But, given the nature of the system and of the actors potentially involved, we assess that we would be unlikely to see such direct evidence. We do assess that hostile actors gained access to the private commercial e-mail accounts of people with whom Secretary Clinton was in regular contact (...all of these [Clinton's] e-mails were housed on unclassified personal servers not even supported by full-time security staff, like those found at Departments and Agencies of the U.S. Government — or even with a commercial service like Gmail...) from her personal account. We also assess that Secretary Clinton’s use of a personal e-mail domain was both known by a large number of people and readily apparent. She also used her personal e-mail extensively while outside the United States, including sending and receiving work-related e-mails in the territory of sophisticated adversaries. Given that combination of factors, we assess it is possible that hostile actors gained access to Secretary Clinton’s personal e-mail account.
I am not avoiding the "real issue". This is an issue. The mis-classification of documents, is another, separate, and in my opinion moderately less damning one.
Almalieque wrote:
TLW wrote:
Since we don't actually care about data security, no problem, right?
It seems that the real problem is the public awareness and discussion of it.
You're confusing the security of the system vs the security of the information. Securing the system is a tool to secure the information. It's not the end all be all. As a result, it is a false equivalency to say that poorly securing a system out of decades of procedural practice is the same as not caring about securing the information.
For example, people use weak passwords. That is poor security, but the people still care for the security of their information.
I was being facetious here, because it was funny to me that Jophiel doesn't appear to care about the security of diplomatic cables, but then cares a lot about hackers and whistle-blowers revealing the poorly secured information publicly. I implied that if there was just quietly hacked he'd be broadly OK with it, because it lets the Democratic establishment save face.
Also, I'm not "confusing the security of the system with the security of the information"; that's an nonsensical conclusion.